In modern ciphers of commercial computer cryptography 4-bit crypto substitution boxes or 4-bit crypto Sboxes are of utmost importance since the late sixties. Since then the 4 bit Boolean functions (BFs) are proved to be the best tool to generate the said 4-bit crypto S-boxes. In this paper the crypto related properties of the 4-bit BFs such as the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the 4-bit BFs, the balancedness, the linearity, the nonlinearity, the affinity and the non-affinity of the 4-bit BFs and the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) of 4-bit BFs are studied in detail. An exhaustive study of 4-bit BFs with some new observations and algorithms on SAC of 4-bit BFs is also reported in this paper. A bit later in the end of nineties the Galois field polynomials over Galois field GF(2 8 ) are in use to generate the 8-bit crypto S-box of the Advance Encryption Standard (AES). A detailed study on generation of the 4-bit crypto S-boxes with such Galois field polynomials over the binary as well as non-binary extended Galois fields is also given in this paper. The generated 4-bit crypto S-boxes are analyzed with four cryptanalysis techniques and the well-defined SAC algorithms of 4-bit crypto S-boxes to search for the best possible 4-bit crypto S-boxes. Some existing 4-bit crypto S-boxes like the 32 4-bit crypto S-boxes of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the four 4-bit crypto S-boxes of the two variants of the Lucifer are analyzed to report the weakness of such S-boxes. A comparative study of the ancient as well as the modern 4-bit crypto S-boxes with the generated 4-bit crypto S-boxes proves the said generated 4-bit crypto S-boxes to be the best possible one.
input is given in the respective row of col.2. The 1-bit output corresponding to 4-bit input is also put in the respective row of col.3. The functional relation of the bit level presentation of a 4-bit BF between a single output bit (y) and four input bits (x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 ) can be expressed as, y = BL-BF(x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 Table 3 .1 is considered as the MSB and the respective bit in row 16, the LSB. The input-output functional relation for vector level presentation of Truth 15 is designated as y, while the decimal Equivalents (DEs) of Galois Field Polynomial of {h} over Finite Field 16 15 is designated as h, as given below.
{h} DE = 0z 15 +1z 14 +2z 13 +3z 12 +4z 11 +5z 10 +6z 9 +7z 8 +8z 7 +9z 6 +az 5 +bz 4 +cz 3 +dz 2 +ez+fz 0 , (z=16) {y} DE = 0z 15 +1z 14 +1z 13 +0z 12 +1z 11 +0z 10 +1z 9 +1z 8 +1z 7 +0z 6 +0z 5 +1z 4 +1z 3 +0z 2 +0z+0z 0 , (z=2) It may be noted that the decimal equivalent of {h} turns out to be 81985529216486895. 
The Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of a 4-bit BF
The 4-bit BF is a mapping from (0,1) 4 to (0,1) 1 which means 4-bit binary input given to a digital system provides 1-bit output. The 4 input bits to a 4-bit Boolean Function (F) are algebraically designated as (x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 ). Following the Bit level presentation of its Truth Table shown in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 .1, the 16 set of inputs are shown in col.1, the corresponding decimal values between 0 and 15 are respectively shown in col.2 and each set of input providing 1-bit output is shown in col.3 expressed by y. Its functional relation, y=F(x)=F(x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 ) can be expressed in Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) with 16 coefficients as given in eq. (2.2) below, y = F(x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 ) = a 0 + (a 1 .x 1 +a 2 .x 2 +a 3 .x 3 (2.2) where y assumes 1-bit output, x represents the decimal or hex value of 4 input bits represented by {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 }, The two operators, '.' and '+' represent AND and XOR operations respectively. Here a 0 is a constant coefficient, (a 1 to a 4 ) are 4 linear coefficients, and (a 5 to a 15 ) are 11 nonlinear coefficients of which (a 5 to a 10 ) are 6 nonlinear coefficients associated with 6 terms having AND-operated-2-input-bits, (a 11 to a 14 ) are 4 nonlinear coefficients associated with 4 terms having AND-operated-3-input-bits and a 15 is a non-linear coefficient associated with one term having AND-operated-4-input-bits. The 16 binary ANF coefficients, from a 0 to a 15 are marked respectively as anf.bit0 to anf.bit15 in ANF representation and are evaluated from the 16-bit output vector of a BF designated as bf.bit0 to bf.bit15 using the following relations as given in eq. ( 3) The DE (Decimal Equivalent) of the output vector {y} of BFs varies from 0 through 65535 and each decimal value is converted to a 16-bit binary output of the Boolean function from bf.bit0 through bf.bit15. Based on the binary outputs of a BF, the ANF coefficients from anf.bit0 through anf.bit15 are calculated sequentially for all BFs using eq. (3.3).
Linear-Nonlinear and Affine-Non-affine groups of 4-bit BFs
All the 65536 16-bit Output Vectors of 4-bit BFs can be divided in two equal groups each having 32768 BFs, one is the linear-nonlinear group having binary bit '0' as MSB and the other one is the affine-non-affine group having binary bit '1' as MSB. The decimal equivalent of output vectors of the linear-nonlinear group monotonically increases from 0 to 32767. The 16 of it are linear, while the other 32752 ones are nonlinear. The affine-non-affine group has also 32768 BFs, each of its decimal equivalents monotonically increases from 32768 to 65535 and becomes decimal-wise complement of a concerned BF belonging to the linear-nonlinear group whose entire 16-bit BF is binary complement to the affine-non-affine BF. The 16 of it are Affine which are bit-wise as well as decimalwise complementary to respective linear ones. The same is true for other 32752 are non-affine BFs in relation to nonlinear ones also. The features and properties of linear-affine and nonlinear-non-affine BFs are discussed in detail in Sec.2.3.1 and Sec.2.3.2 respectively.
Linear and Affine 4-bit BFs
The four 16-bit Input Vectors {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 } shown in Table 3 .2 such four Basic Linear BFs and their corresponding ANFs are mentioned in columns 2 and 7 respectively with C=0 along the "relation number" rows of 1, 2, 5 and 9 respectively. It may now be mentioned that 'xor' operation being a linear operation, its successive applications involving two, three or four basic linear BFs are expected to provide linear BFs. It may be noted that xor operation involving two of the four basic linear BFs gives rise to six linear BFs shown in 6 rows of relation number 4, 6, 7, 10, successive two xor operations involving three of the four basic linear BFs. Successive three xor operations involving all the four basic linear BFs provide one linear BF shown in row of relation number 16. All these can be seen in Table 3 .2. The number of linear BFs evolved out of the four basic linear BFs turns out to be 11. There are one constant linear BFs having 16 '0's as its output (vide row of relation number = 1. Altogether there are 16 linear BFs. The ANF coefficients mentioned in column 7 of Table 2 indicate that all the 11 nonlinear coefficients of all these linear BFs are zero. The 16 affine BFs shown in column 5 are obtained by bit-wise complementing all the 16 bits of the respective linear BFs. It may also be noted that considering decimal equivalents the linear and the corresponding affine BFs shown in the same row of Table 2 .2 are complementary to each other. The discussed matter is elaborated as follows, Table 3 .2 under its headings 'x1', 'x2', 'x3'or 'x4' respectively and is designated as IV1, IV2, IV3 or IV4 respectively and is termed as four fixed 16-bit Input Vectors (IPVs) of all 4-bit BFs.
 Constant Linear BF:
There is one constant linear BF shown in column 2 of relation no. 1 of Table 3 .2 with C=0. Corresponding to each of 16 set of 4-bit inputs shown in column 1, the 16 output bits of the BF with C=0 are also '0' as shown in column 3 of relation no.1. Its 16 ANF coefficients also turn out to be zero as shown in column 7 of the same relation no. Table 3 .2 becomes the 16-bit output of a BF, the four BFs can be defined as F 1 (x) = C+x 1 , F 2 (x) = C+x 2 , F 3 (x) = C+x 3 or F 4 (x) = C+x 4 , all with C = 0, as shown in relation no., 3, 5 or 9 of column 2 and their respective output is given in the corresponding relation no. of column 3. Following the ANF formalism of a BF given in eq. (3.2) of Sec.3.2.2, one can conclude that for each of the four BFs defined above, only one of the 4 linear ANF coefficients has a binary value 1 and all other coefficients are zero, indicating a 1 = 1 for F 1 (x), a 2 = 1 for F 2 (x), a 3 = 1 for F 3 (x) and a 4 = 1 for F 4 (x) as shown in relation no. 2, 3, 5 and 9 of column 7 respectively. This indicates that F 1 (x) = x 1, F 2 (x) = x 2 , F 3 (x) = x 3 and F 4 (x) = x 4 are the four Basic Linear BFs (BLBFs). The same ANF coefficients are also obtained if these are computed using respective BF outputs given in relation no. 2, 3, 5 or 9 of column 3. All other Linear BFs are obtained using the four Basic Linear BFs. It may be noted that the 16 linear BFs and 16 affine BFs including the constant ones are so organized in Table 3 .2 that the Decimal Equivalent of Boolean Function (DEBF) of all of them appear in an ascending order for linear BFs and that of the affine BFs, in a descending order as a decimal-wise complement of 65535 of the respective linear BFs. 
Non Linear and Non Affine 4-bit BFs:
The 4-bit BFs with constant term C = '0' and with at least one '1' present in the subheadings 5 through f in the column 7 of table 3.2 with or without 1s in the subheadings 1 through 4 of the table 3.2. So the nonlinearity is judged on the basis of the presence of nonlinear ANF coefficients or ANF product terms in the concerned 16 bit ANF coefficient vector or the concerned ANF equation derived from equation 3.2. Here in equation 3.2 a 5 to a 15 are 11 nonlinear coefficients of which (a 5 to a 10 ) are 6 nonlinear coefficients associated with 6 terms having ANDoperated-2-input-bits. If at most these nonlinear terms are present in the concerned nonlinear ANF equation then the algebraic nonlinearity is counted to be 2 nd order algebraic nonlinearity. If at most a 11 to a 14 or 4 terms having ANDoperated-3-input-bits are present then the 3 rd order algebraic nonlinearity and if at most a 15 or one term having ANDoperated-4-input-bits is present then the then the 4 th order algebraic nonlinearity is observed. The same is for nonaffine BFs with C = '1'. The only difference of 2 nd , 3 rd and 4 th order algebraic non-affinity [15] is the presence of the constant term or C ='1'. The number of nonlinear and non-affine 4-bit BFs satisfied some of the categories of algebraic nonlinearity are presented in table. 2.3. The maximum nonlinearity or in colloquial term the nonlinearity (NL) of a 4-bit nonlinear or non-affine BF is the number of 1s in the 16 bit hamming distance vector (HDV) with the minimum number of 1s among 32 HDVs generated from the bitwise xor operation of the 4-bit nonlinear or non-affine BF to the 16 linear 4-bit BFs and 16 affine 4-bit BFs [16] . For 4-bit BFs the maximum value of maximum nonlinearity is 6 and the minimum value of maximum nonlinearity is 1 [17] . The numbers of nonlinear and non-affine 4-bit BFs with NL equal to 1 through 6 are noted in table 2.3. The tables are discussed below, 
Balanced and Unbalanced 4-bit BFs.

First Order Strict Avalanche Criterion (FO-SAC) of the 4-bit BFs.
A 4-bit BF is said to satisfy Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) if, on flipping all bits of one of the four 16-bit input vectors, 50% of its output bits gets flipped and the changed 16-bit output vector may be balanced or unbalanced. This property of BFs can also be named as the First Order (FO)-SAC. The FO-SAC of some balanced and unbalanced 4-bit BFs are noted in table.2.3 [19] .
Successive First Order Strict Avalanche Criterion (SFO-SAC) of the 4-bit BFs [20].
On successively flipping two of the four input bit vectors, if a particular BF successively satisfies two respective FO-SACs then the BF is said to satisfy Two Successive First Order (SFO) SACs. In the event three or four input bit vectors are successively flipped and it is observed that if a particular BF successively satisfies three or four FO-SACs, the concerned BF is said to satisfy three or four SFO-SACs, The SFO-SAC for the same balanced and unbalanced 4-bit BFs are noted in table.2.3.
Multiple Higher Order Strict Avalanche Criterion (MHO-SAC) of the 4-bit BFs.
Besides SFO-SACs, one can also consider another type of SAC, namely Higher Order (HO) SAC. If two or more Input Vectors (IPVs) are simultaneously flipped, the bits in the BF before and after flip is changed in 8 positions and in rest 8 positions remains the same then the BF is said to satisfy Higher Order (HO) SACsfor two IPVs, it is said as Second Order HO-SAC, for three, Third Order HO-SAC and for four, fourth Order HO-SAC. The MHO-SAC for the same balanced and unbalanced 4-bit BFs are noted in table.2.3.
Strict Avalanche Criterion for 4-bit BFs and 4-bit S-boxes:
The Strict Avalanche Criterion is introduced by Webster and Tavares [1] 
S-box:
A 4-bit S-box can be written as follows in table 3.1.1, where the each element of the first row of table 3.1.1, entitled as index, are the position of each element of the S-box within the given S-box and the elements of the 2 nd row, entitled as S-box, are the elements of the given S-box. It can be concluded that the 1 st row is fixed for all possible Sboxes. The values of each element of the 1 st row are distinct, unique and vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the each element of the 2 nd row of the S-box are also distinct and unique and also vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the elements of the fixed 1 st row are sequential and monotonically increase where for the 2 nd row they can be sequential or partly sequential or non-sequential. Here the given substitution box is the 1 st S-box of the 1 st given S-box out of 8 of the Data Encryption Standard [11] . Step 0B: ev[4] ={{0,0,0,1},{0,0,1,0},{0,1,0,0},{1,0,0 
Analogy of DC to MHO-SAC of the S-boxes:
Since complement of a bit is a similar operation of the xor of bit value 1 with the said bit so complement of a 4-bit BF is similar operation to xor operation of the bit value one with the each bit of the said 4-bit BF. In DC for ID 1, 2, 4 and 8 IPV1, IPV2, IPV3 and IPV4 are complemented since BIN ID of the said IDs contain 1 in position 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. So the distant S-box for a certain ID in DC contains four complemented OPBFs of the S-box for the MHO-SAC-Bin ID. Now for other IDs the respective complementation of the 2, 3 or 4 IPVs together are shown in table 3.3.1. So the distant S-box for them in DC contains four complemented OPBFs of the S-box for the MHO-SAC-Bin ID. The difference S-box contains four difference 4-bit BFs. If they are balanced for a particular ID then the S-box is said to satisfy MHO-SAC-Bin ID of the 4-bit S-boxes. So it is clear from the table that the procedure of DC for ID 0 to F and MHO-SAC-0000 (Bin ID) to MHO-SAC-1111 (Bin ID) are same. Table 4 .1, where the each element of the first row of Table 4 .1, entitled as index, are the position of each element of the 4-bit crypto S-box within the given 4-bit crypto S-box and the elements of the 2 nd row entitled as S-box are the elements of the given 4-bit crypto S-box. It can be concluded that the 1 st row is fixed for all possible 4-bit crypto S-boxes. The values of each element of the 1 st row are distinct, unique and vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the each element of the 2 nd row of a crypto S-box are also distinct and unique and also vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the elements of the fixed 1 st row are sequential and monotonically increasing where for the 2 nd row they can be sequential or partly sequential or non-sequential. Here the given Substitution box is the 1 st 4-bit S-box of the 1 st S-box out of 8 of Data Encryption Standard [18] [19] [20] .
4-bit Crypto S-boxes. A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as follows in
Relation between 4-bit S-boxes and 4-bit Boolean Functions (4-bit BFs).
Index of Each element of a 4-bit crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence that are given in column 1 through G of row 1 and row 6 under row heading Index and S-box respectively. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table 4 .2. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given crypto S-box and each element of the crypto S-box itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that are 16 bit long input vectors (IPVs) and 4-bit output BFs (OPBFs) respectively. column 1 through G of Row 2 is termed as 4 th IPV, Row 3 is termed as 3 rd IPV, Row 4 is termed as 2 nd IPV and Row 5 is termed as 1 st IPV whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 is termed as 4 th OPBF, Row 8 is termed as 3 rd OPBF, Row 9 is termed as 2 nd OPBF and Row A is termed as 1 st OPBF [21] . The decimal equivalent of the each IPV and the each OPBF is noted at column H of the respective rows. [22] . The example of BIC of 4-bit S-boxes has been given in Table 4 .3. below and Pseudo code with time complexity analysis are given in this section, In Table 4 .3. each column from column 1 through G of row 1 represents each element of 1 st 4-bit S-box of Data Encryption Standard or DES. Column 1 through G of each row 2 through 5 is each of four OPBFs, OPBF4, OPBF3, OPBF2, OPBF1 respectively. Column 1 through G of each row 6 through B is each of six DBFs, DBF(4,3), DBF(4,2), DBF(4,1), DBF(3,2), DBF(3,1) and DBF(2,1) respectively. The analysis shows that 6 DBFs are balanced i.e. consists of 8 0s and 8 1s, so at most uncertainty to determine the occurrence of 0 and 1 value in all four OPBFs. So the given 4-bit S-box is said to satisfy (Output) Bit Independence Criterion of the 4-bit crypto S-boxes. Time complexity of the given pseudo code. Time complexity of the algorithm has been O(n 2 ) since the body contains two nested loops.
Generation and analysis of existing and generated 4-bit crypto S-boxes.
The procedure to analyze 4-bit crypto S-boxes with the given analyzing procedures are described in subsection 5.1. The analysis of the existing 4-bit crypto S-boxes of the Data Encryption Standard and two variants of Lucifer are given in subsection 5.2. The generated 16 4-bit crypto S-boxes from 64 distinct nonlinear BFs are also analyzed and proven to be the best possible ones. The analysis is given in section 5.3.
Cryptanalysis procedure.
'No.elr' shows number of existing linear relations out of 64 possible linear relations in a 4-bit crypto S-box. 'No.8' shows number of 8s in linear approximation table or LAT. 'N0.dif' shows number of 0s in difference distribution table or DDT and 'N8.dat' shows number of 8s in differential approximation table or DAT [21] . The procedures are discussed as follows,
In difference distribution table there are 256 cells, i.e. 16 rows and 16 columns. Each row is for each input difference varies from 0 to f in hex. Each column in each row represents each output difference varies from 0 to f in hex for each input difference. 0 in any cell indicates absence of that output difference for subsequent input difference. Such as 0 in a cell of DDT means for input difference 0 the corresponding output difference is absent. If numbers of 0s are too low or too high it supplies more information regarding concerned output difference. So an Sbox is said to be immune to this cryptanalytic attack if number of 0s in DDT is close to 128 or half of total cells or 256. In the said example of 1 st DES 4-bit S-box total numbers of 0s in DDT are 168. That is close to 128. So the Sbox is said to be almost secure from this attack. [21] As total number of balanced 4-bit BFs increases in Difference Analysis Table or DAT the security of S-box increases since balanced 4-bit BFs supplies at most uncertainty. Since Number of 0s and 1s in balanced 4-bit BFs are equal i.e. they are same in number means determination of each bit has been at most uncertainty. In the said example of 1 st DES 4-bit S-box total numbers of 8s in DAT are 36. That is close to 32 half of total 64 cells. So the S-box has been said to be almost less secure from this attack. [21] In linear approximation table or LAT there are 256 cells for 256 possible 4-bit linear relations. The count of 16 4-bit binary conditions to satisfy for any given linear relation is put into the concerned cell. 8 in a cell indicate that the particular linear relation is satisfied for 8, 4-bit binary conditions and remain unsatisfied for 8, 4-bit binary conditions. That is at most uncertainty. In the said example of 1 st DES 4-bit S-box total numbers of 8s in LAT is 143. That is close to 128. So the S-box is said to be less secure from this attack.
The value of n C r is maximum when the value of r is ½ of the value of n (when n is even). Here the maximum number of linear approximations is 64. So if the total satisfaction of linear equation is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 linear equations is the largest. That means if the total satisfaction is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 possible linear equations is 64 C 32. That is maximum number of possible sets of linear equations. If the value of total number of linear relations is closed to 32 then it is more cryptanalysis immune. Since the number of possible sets of linear equations are too large to calculate. As the value goes close to 0 or 64 it reduces the sets of possible linear equations to search, that reduces the effort to search for the linear equations present in a particular 4-bit crypto S-box. In this example total satisfaction is 21 out of 64. Which means the given 4-bit S-Box is not a good 4 bit crypto S-box or not a good crypt analytically immune 4-bit crypto S-box.
If the value of total number of existing linear relations for a 4-bit crypto S-box is 24 to 32, then the lowest numbers of sets of linear equations are 250649105469666120. This is a very large number to investigate. So the 4-bit crypto S-box is declared as a good 4-bit crypto S-box or 4-bit crypto S-box with good security. If it is between 16 through 23 then the lowest numbers of sets of linear equations are 488526937079580. This not a small number to investigate in today's computing scenario so the S-boxes are declared as medium 4-bit crypto S-box or 4-bit crypto S-box with medium security. The 4-bit crypto S-boxes having existing linear equations less than 16 are declared as poor 4-bit crypto S-Box or vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack [21] .
'No.sac', 'N2sac', 'N3sac' and 'Nalsac' gives total number times four 4-bit BFs of the concerned S-box satisfies 4 simple first order SAC, 6, 2 nd order HO-SAC, 4, 3 rd order HO-SAC and 16, 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th order HO-SAC respectively. e4d12fb83a6c5907  21  143  168  36  7  15  11  36  0f74e2d1a6cb9538  29  143  168  36  7  17  9  36  41e8d62bfc973a50  23  138  168  36  8  15  11  36  fc8249175b3ea06d  25  154  166  42  10  20  12  42  f18e6b34972dc05a  24  132  162  30  6  12  9  30  3d47f28ec01a69b5  21  143  166  30  8  12  7  30   0e7ba4d158c6932f   31  143  166  21  4  10  6  21  d8a13f42b67c05e9  20  126  168  36  8  12  12  36  a09e63f51dc7b428  17  133  162  30  7  12  8  30  d709346a285ecbf1  22  133  168  30  7  13  8  30  d6498f30b12c5ae7  23  151  166  21  6  9  4  21  1ad069874fe3b52c  28  158  174  30  6  11  10  30  7de3069a1285bc4f  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  d8b56f03472c1ae9  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  a690cb7df13e5284  20  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  3f06a1d8945bc72e  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  2c417ab6853fd0e9  25  137  162  30  6  14  8  30  eb2c47d150fa3986  20  143  166  36  8  16  9  36  421bad78f9c5630e  30  130  160  27  6  11  7  27  b8c71e2d6f09a453  21  134  166  18  3  7  6  18  c1af92680d34e75b  30  141  159  36  8  16  10  36  af427c9561de0b38  29  127  164  36  7  15  11  36  9ef528c3704a1db6  24  127  168  18  5  7  5  18  432c95fabe17608d  24  130  162  30  6  12  9  30  4b2ef08d3c975a61  26  134  168  30  7  13  8  30  d0b7491ae35c2f86  27  145  166  30  7  14  7  30  14bdc37eaf680592  28  137  168  36  8  16  10  36  6bd814a7950fe23c  25  135  173  0  0  0  0  0  d2846fb1a93e50c7  23  144  161  30  8  14  7  30  1fd8a374c56b0e92  20  147  174  27  9  12  4  27  7b419ce206adf358  27  132  166  18  5  7  5  18  21e74a8dfc90356b  28  138  168  39  8  16  12  39  Table.5 That is all S-boxes are secured from this attack. At last out of 32 DES S-boxes 1 have 0, 3 have 18, 2 have 21, 2 have 27, 10 have 30, 12 have 36, 1 have 39 and 1 have 42 8s in DAT i.e. they have been less secure to this attack. The comparative analysis has proved that linear approximation analysis is the most time efficient cryptanalytic algorithm for 4-bit S-boxes. In 'nosac' the lowest value is 0 and maximum value is 10 where in 'n2sac', 'n3sac' and 'nalsac' lowest values are 0, 0, 0 and maximum values are 16, 12 and 39 respectively. But numbers of optimum as well as better result i.e. 16 for 'nosac' is absent, close to 24 for 'n2sac', close to 16 for 'n3sac' and close to 64 for 'nalsac' has been very less in numbers. So the 32 DES 4-bit S-boxes are observed to be less secure.
Discussion on cryptanalysis of 32 4-bit crypto S-boxes of Data Encryption Standard or DES and 4 S-boxes of two variants of
Discussion on cryptanalysis of 4, 4-bit crypto S-boxes of 2 variants of Lucifer.
2 variants of Lucifer one by feistel [22] , and one by Sorkin [23] contain total 4 crypto S-boxes. The cryptanalysis of the concerned 4, crypto S-boxes is shown in table.8. and the result is also discussed below. 
Lucifer S-boxes
